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ABSTRACT 
Sidgwick’s arguments for hedonism imply that virtue is not a good. Those arguments seemed 
to many wholly unpersuasive. The paper analyzes them, focusing also (especially in the final 
Appendix) on many changes Sidgwick made on chapter XIV of Book III through the various 
editions of the Methods. From an analysis of the first sections of this chapter, it emerges that 
Sidgwick employed two different argumentative schemes, one against the view that virtue is 
the sole good and the other against the much more diffused claim that virtue is one of the 
goods. These arguments can be fully understood in the context of Sidgwick’s general claim 
that only “desiderable conscious life” is good. Sidgwick’s general point is that virtue, insofar 
as it is valuable as an end, is so because of the feelings or consciousness associated with it. 
 
 
Sidgwick’s arguments for consequentialism seem, for a time, to have been 
wholly persuasive. Until Prichard’s “Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mis-
take?” there are at best few deontologists, and even after Prichard, deontology 
did not revive until Carritt and Ross.  
Sidgwick’s arguments for hedonism seem to have been almost wholly unper-
suasive.1 Both ideal utilitarians and their deontological opponents agree that 
there are intrinsic goods other than pleasure. Virtue is seen not only as good, but 
as the most important good. This is the view of Hayward, Rashdall, Prichard, 
Ross, Carritt and Ewing.2 Moore, though less enthusiastic, agrees that virtue is 
                                                 
1 Hayward writes that “Sidgwick has done for [hedonism] what Plato did for his idealistic 
metaphysics, he has shown that the opposing arguments are almost — if not quite — as 
strong as the arguments in its favour” (F. H. Hayward, The Ethical Philosophy of Sidgwick 
(London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1901) p. 226). 
2 See, for example, Hayward, Philosophy ch. 8; Hastings Rashdall, The Theory of Good and 
Evil (London: Oxford University Press, 1924) v. i pp. 64-5, 71-3, 75-6, 94, 100-1, 267, Ethics 
(London: T. C. and E. C. Jack, 1913) pp. 27, 51, 64-6, 70, 72, “Professor Sidgwick’s Utilitari-
anism,” Mind o.s. 10, 1885; H. A. Prichard, Moral Writings (Oxford: Clarendon, 2002) pp. 11-
12, 55-6, 61-2, 99-100 (later he claims that virtue is the only good (p. 173; Prichard to Ross, 
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at least one good.3 It is, then, worth examining Sidgwick’s arguments against 
virtue as a good, to see where, if anywhere, he went wrong. 
There is another reason to look at these arguments. Their chapter (III.XIV) 
of the Methods — “the most important chapter” — went through many 
changes through different editions.4 The result is a bit of a mess — hardly the 
“pure white light” for which Sidgwick is famous.5 In the Appendix, I document 
these changes.  
One preliminary: Different proponents of virtue mean slightly different things 
by “virtue.” In The Right and the Good Ross thinks of virtue as the possession of 
certain desires, especially “the desire to do one’s duty, the desire to bring into 
being something that is good, and the desire to give pleasure or save pain to 
others.”6 Prichard and Carritt separate “virtue” — desires such as the desire to 
help others out of sympathy, or to act courageously “from a sense of shame at 
being terrified,” without thought of duty — and “moral goodness,” the desire to 
do one’s duty (where one thinks of the action as one’s duty).7 Thus Carritt de-
fines virtuous dispositions as “those which lead people to do impulsively and ef-
fectively what reflection would generally or often show to be obligatory.” Sym-
pathy is his main example.8 (I shall follow Ross in grouping both sorts of desire 
as “virtue.”9) In Foundations of Ethics Ross includes, in addition to desires, acts 
of will, emotions such as satisfaction at the pleasure of another or sorrow at her 
pain, and “character,” the state underlying these desires, willings, and emotions 
which exists even when they do not.10 Rashdall includes one’s will, desires (to do 
one’s duty or to help others), feelings, emotions, and moral beliefs. Moore in-
cludes “a love of some intrinsically good consequence which [one] expects to 
___________________________ 
Bodleian Library, Oxford, Ms. Eng. Lett. d. 116, December 20, 1928)); W. D. Ross, The Right 
and the Good (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1930) pp. 134, 150-4, Foundations of Ethics 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939) pp. 275, 283-4, 290-2; E. F. Carritt, Ethical and Po-
litical Thinking (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1947) pp. 66, 83, 85-6, 90; A. C. Ewing, 
Ethics (New York: Free Press, 1953) pp. 46-7, 61. 
3 G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903) pp. 177-9, 
217-19, Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965) p. 102. 
4 Hayward, Philosophy p. 220. 
5 Brand Blanshard, “Sidgwick, the Man” Monist 58, 1974, 349. 
6 Ross, Right p. 134. 
7 Prichard, p. 16. See also pp. 55-6, 61-2, 154, 160, 216, 218.  
8 Carritt, p. 85. 
9 Ross, Right p. 161. 
10 Ross, Foundations pp. 290-3. 
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produce by his action or a hatred of some intrinsically evil consequence which 
[one] hopes to prevent by it” and “the emotion excited by [the thought of ] 
rightness.”11 Ewing includes willings, emotions such as love, and attitudes to 
others (such as displayed in fairness).12 
In his initial discussion of virtue, Sidgwick has much the same view. Virtue is 
“a quality of the soul or mind.”13 It is manifested in volitions and (for some vir-
tues, such as gratitude, benevolence, and purity) in emotions or feelings (222-3, 
226). One’s motive can be love of virtue or duty, or certain natural affections, 
such as humility or spontaneous sympathy (223, 225, 226). For some virtues, 
such as justice and veracity, we do not require either a thought of duty or an 
emotion, but rather just a “settled resolve to will” (224).  
 
 
1. In III.XIV, Sidgwick begins (§ 1.) by rejecting the view that “‘General Good’ 
consists solely in general Virtue,” or that “Virtue…constitute[s] Ultimate 
Good,” or is “the sole Ultimate Good” (392, 394, 395). This “ — if we mean by 
Virtue conformity to such prescriptions and prohibitions as make up the main 
part of the morality of Common Sense — would involve us in a logical circle; 
since we have seen that the exact determination of these prescriptions and pro-
hibitions must depend on the definition of this…Good” (392). Sidgwick takes 
himself to have established that the relevant prescriptions and prohibitions are 
rules concerning the production and just distribution of goods. We do not know 
the content of the rules without knowing what is good; being told that what is 
good is just conformity to the rules is useless.  
                                                 
11 Moore, Principia pp. 177, 179. Moore thinks the latter of small value when it lacks the ha-
tred found in the former (218-19). 
12 Ewing, Ethics pp. 47, 61, 67, Second Thoughts in Moral Philosophy (New York: Macmillan, 
1959) pp. 106, 132, 134-5, 140. 
13 Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981) p. 222. Subsequent 
parenthetical references are to the seventh edition of The Methods. Parenthetical references to 
earlier editions give the edition followed by the page. The first edition came out in 1874, the 
second in 1877, the third in 1884, the fourth in 1890, and the fifth in 1893 (all London: Mac-
millan). Other works by Sidgwick cited are Outlines of the History of Ethics (OHE) (London: 
Macmillan, 1896), “Some Fundamental Ethical Controversies” (FC), Mind o.s. 14, 1889, and 
Lectures on the Ethics of T. H. Green, Mr. H. Spencer, and J. Martineau (GSM) (London: 
Macmillan, 1902). 
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Against this argument — call it the circle argument — one could deny that 
virtue is conformity to rules. One might claim, for example, that to be virtuous 
is to have certain emotions, or a certain will, or certain knowledge, or a certain 
disposition. As long as these other things could be specified without introducing 
other goods, the circle argument is evaded. 
Sidgwick considers most of the proposals just suggested. 
(i) He admits (§ 2.) that if the virtuous person is simply one with a will to do 
what she takes to be right, the circle argument fails (394). But he objects, plau-
sibly, that (a) we think some course of action is right, and other goods are 
needed to explain what makes it right, and (b) we think the will to do what one 
takes to be right is not always the will one ought to have, implying that there 
are other goods that limit it (394-5). (b) is not conclusive: one could hold that 
this will is not always the will one ought to have, without thinking that the rea-
son is that other things are good. For one might think, with the deontologists, 
that an ought-claim such as “one ought not to will to do what one takes to be 
right” can be justified without relying on any claim about the good (though 
Prichard, Carritt and Ross themselves would not make this particular ought-
claim). I consider deontology below.  
(ii) Sidgwick argues that we value certain types of dispositions only because 
of the feelings or actions that realise them (393-4). He might be wrong here: we 
might value a disposition, say, to feel sorrow at the pain of others even if one 
never encounters anyone in pain and so never feels the sorrow. We might think 
a person who would feel sorrow is better than a person who would not, even if 
neither encounters a case that makes their difference manifest. But many will 
see no value in a useless disposition. And it would be odd to value only the dis-
position, and that is what would be needed to avoid the circle argument.14  
(iii) Sidgwick does not consider explicitly the suggestion that virtue consists 
in having certain emotions. At times, he writes as if virtue is strictly a matter of 
“conduct” or “action” (395, 396). But he does mention feelings when discussing 
the character suggestion, and, as noted, feelings are prominent in the earlier dis-
cussion of some of the virtues. Presumably, however, he could again argue that 
                                                 
14 Sidgwick might also note the current scepticism about the existence of these traits or dispo-
sitions inspired by situationist psychologists. For discussion of the literature and its upshot 
for virtue, see Gilbert Harman, “Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics 
and the Fundamental Attribution Error,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99, 315-31 
and John M. Doris, Lack of Character (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
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it would be odd to value only feelings. A virtuous person does not only feel sor-
row at the pain of others, but acts to alleviate the pain in at least some cases. 
Moreover, the obvious explanation for why sorrow at pain is good is that pain is 
bad. 
(iv) The proposal that virtue is knowledge is historically important, since it is 
made by the Stoics, the most prominent defenders of the view that virtue is the 
only good. Sidgwick objects with another application of the circle argument: if, 
as he suggests Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics thought, the knowledge in ques-
tion is knowledge of what is good, no guidance is forthcoming (376-7, OHE 
76).15 He notes, however, that the Stoics could reply that the knowledge is 
knowledge of what is to be preferred or rejected, and that what is to be preferred 
or rejected can be learned by observing how Nature has designed us (378n1, 
OHE 79-80). For example, Nature has designed us not to mutilate ourselves, 
hence self-mutilation is to be rejected. Against this, Sidgwick does not make the 
standard objection that speaking of what is to be preferred or rejected is just 
another way of speaking of what is good or bad. Nor does he object (though he 
surely would) to the theological beliefs he argues are needed to give the appeal 
to Nature normative force (81, OHE 77-9). Instead, he objects that the appeal 
to Nature’s design does not provide consistent guidance: on one interpretation, 
it recommends rejecting what is “artificial and conventional;” on another inter-
pretation, it recommends accepting what is established; and the Stoics did not 
show the superiority of one interpretation to the other (378n1, OHE 81-2). Simi-
larly, he earlier objects that we need guidance when we have conflicting im-
pulses, so one must be able to identify the impulses whose selection counts as 
conforming to Nature. But there is no way to do this: neither the impulses that 
are most common nor first nor independent of human action are plausible can-
didates for impulses that ought to be followed (81-2).16  
Sidgwick has a further argument against taking knowledge as the good. Later 
in III.XIV, he will argue that knowledge is not even one good. I consider this 
argument below. If it works, it would also rule out the specific sort of knowledge 
the Stoics valued.  
                                                 
15 For ancient versions of this objection to the Stoics and consideration of Stoic replies, see 
Gisela Striker, Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1996) pp. 238-9, 217-219, 320-324. 
16 Sidgwick does not mention the Stoics here, but the problem of selecting impulses when they 
conflict was raised, and not solved, by the Stoics and their critics. For discussion, see Striker, 
pp. 219, 258-261. 
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A second strategy against the circle argument is to admit, as the suggestions 
above do not, that virtue is at least in part conformity to rules, but to argue 
that the rules do not need an account of the good to make them precise. For ex-
ample, one might hold, with the Stoics, that the rules depend only on an ac-
count of what is to be preferred or rejected.17 Or one might hold, with deontolo-
gists, that since at least some rules are not justified by appeals to the good, they 
can be made precise without such an appeal. I have discussed the Stoic sugges-
tion: Sidgwick seems to admit that this evades the circle argument; he argues 
that it falters when it tries to give an account of what is to be preferred or re-
jected. But the deontology strategy requires comment.  
Sidgwick does not consider the deontology strategy, presumably because he 
takes his earlier discussion of common sense morality to have shown the need 
for an account of the good. But even without this earlier argument, he could 
note that deontologists such as Ross give a role to the good. Ross subsumes four 
of his seven prima facie duties under the general duty of promoting the good. 
And the duties that Ross argues cannot be subsumed, such as the duty to keep 
promises, are independent of the good only in the sense that it can be right to 
fulfill them even when an alternative action would produce more good. Consid-
erations of the good still enter into deciding whether one has an obligation to 
keep a particular promise. Thus Ross holds that whether a promise is binding 
depends on unspoken qualifications, and these qualifications seem to specify 
that keeping the promise will still bring about the good foreseen at the time of 
making it (or at least some good). For example, I am not bound to keep a prom-
ise to replace a string on a fiddle of someone about to die (or who no longer 
wants it replaced), but I am bound to keep a promise to make good the financial 
loss caused by my breaking a string on the dying man’s fiddle, since the dying 
man’s heirs would otherwise lose.18 Further, how easily the prima facie duty to 
keep a promise can be overridden by other duties depends in part on the value 
of the promised service to the promisee.19 More generally, Ross makes it a neces-
                                                 
17 Rashdall suggests this as a reply in defence of “Green’s Stoicism,” though Rashdall himself 
rejects it (“Utilitarianism” 206-8). Tom Hurka suggests it, noting Rashdall, for the Stoics 
(Thomas Hurka, Virtue, Vice, and Value (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001) p. 9). 
Sidgwick himself writes that “the Stoic distinction between Good and Evil, and Preferred and 
Rejected, is very much wanted by Green,” though it is not clear that he has the circle argu-
ment in mind (GSM 99).  
18 Ross, Foundations pp. 94, 110; also 95-7. 
19 Ross, Foundations p. 100. 
  
ROBERT SHAVER 
 216
sary condition on the performance of duty that some good is produced.20 Ross 
can say all this without failing to be a deontologist, since it remains true that 
sometimes one ought to produce less good rather than more; but (as I think he 
would admit) the good still has a role in making precise even duties that are not 
duties to produce the most good.  
Sidgwick does mention what could be considered an example of the deontol-
ogy strategy. He notes that “qualities commonly admired, such as Energy, Zeal, 
Self-control, Thoughtfulness, are obviously regarded as virtues only when they 
are directed to good ends” (392-3). One might disagree: I think we sometimes do 
treat these qualities as virtues even when they are directed to bad ends. Some 
admire these qualities in, for example, criminals. But Sidgwick could reply that 
our admiration is probably limited by consideration of the good — our admira-
tion for a criminal’s zeal may diminish if, say, he is a mass murderer rather than 
one of Ocean’s Eleven.21 And even if this is not so, it would be implausible to 
think that all virtues are independent of the good. 
I conclude that the circle argument, while not as clear-cut as it might appear, 
can be defended with various follow-up arguments. But the biggest objection 
concerns its target: it hurts only those who take virtue to be the sole good. Al-
though this might be the position of Green and (perhaps) Bradley, and Sidgwick 
directs the circle argument against Green, it is not the “very commonplace” po-
sition of Rashdall, Ross, etc. (GSM 73-6).22 The view that “the character realised 
in and developed through Right conduct […] is the sole Ultimate good […] is 
not implied in the Intuitional view of Ethics: nor would it […] accord with the 
moral common sense of modern Christian communities” (3). “[I]t is not com-
monly held that the whole Good of man lies in…obedience to moral rules” (391). 
Sidgwick realises he needs, and goes on to give, a different argument against the 
view that virtue is one good.  
Despite this, Sidgwick is sometimes misleading. After giving the circle argu-
ment and considering replies, such as taking the virtuous person to be one who 
                                                 
20 Ross, Right p. 162. 
21 Anthony Skelton noted that this is not Sidgwick’s actual reply. Sidgwick thinks our admi-
ration is “quasi-moral” and that “we certainly should not call them virtuous” (219). 
22 Rashdall, “Utilitarianism” 208. It is worth noting, however, that some seem to assume that 
there is but one good — this characterises the debate between Hayward and E. E. Constance 
Jones (Hayward, “The True Significance of Sidgwick’s ‘Ethics,’” “A Reply to E. E. Con-
stance Jones,” and Constance Jones, “Mr. Hayward’s Evaluation of Professor Sidgwick’s 
Ethics,” International Journal of Ethics 11, 1900-1, 175-87, 360-5, 354-60).  
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simply wills to do what she takes to be right, he concludes that “reflection 
shows that [virtues and talents] are only valuable on account of the good or de-
sirable conscious life in which they are or will be actualised, or which will be 
somehow promoted by their exercise” (395). If this is intended as a restatement 
of the point that types of character are valuable only because of the feelings or 
actions that realise them, it is unobjectionable.23 But Sidgwick immediately 
starts the next section by writing that “particular virtues and talents and gifts 
are largely valued as means to ulterior good,” as if this has been established 
(396). Again, if this is intended as a restatement of the point about character, it 
is fine — but in both places one has the impression that Sidgwick thinks he has 
shown something more, namely that the will, desire, and emotion involved in 
virtue are valuable only as means to something else. Hence the discussion on 
396 concerns whether something can be valuable as both means and end; this 
seems to assume not just that types of character are valuable only because of 
the feelings or actions that realise them, but also that it has been shown that the 
feelings or actions are largely valued as means. The circle argument does not 
show that.24  
One possibility is that Sidgwick takes the circle argument to show the pres-
ence of another good, and then that, when one looks at the other good, one sees 
that one finds the virtue good only when it produces this other good. The circle 
argument does not by itself entail that virtues are valued only as means, but it 
is the first step in suggesting this.25 Thus after giving the circle argument, Sidg-
wick writes that  
 
                                                 
23 That it is a restatement of this point is clearer in earlier editions. In the third edition, the 
puzzling claim from 395 is part of the paragraph rejecting dispositions (3.393). In the fourth 
edition, the paragraph starts with “what has been before said of Virtue regarded as a quality 
or element of character,” where what has been before said is that dispositions are not ulti-
mately good (4.396). The criticism of virtues and talents is that “reflection shews that they 
are really conceived as potentialities not valuable in themselves” (4.397). 
24 The problem may result from careless revision. The misleading claim quoted from 395 was 
introduced as part of a paragraph in the second edition that followed the circle argument 
(2.365; also 3.393). In the second edition, Sidgwick took the circle argument to show that vir-
tue is not even one good. There it made sense to say that virtues are only instrumentally 
good.  
25 I owe this reading to Joyce Jenkins. 
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our notions of special virtues […] contain…the same reference to ‘Good’ […] as 
an ultimate standard. This appears clearly when we consider any virtue in rela-
tion to the cognate vice […] into which it tends to pass over when pushed to an 
extreme […].For example, Common Sense may seem to regard Liberality, Fru-
gality, Courage, Placability, as intrinsically desirable: but when we consider 
their relation respectively to Profusion, Meanness, Foolhardiness, Weakness, we 
find that Common Sense draws the line […] by reference […] to the general no-
tion of ‘Good’ (392). 
My own answer to the question […] Why is the ultimate good […] held to be 
pleasure? is, that nothing but pleasure appears to the reflective mind to be good 
in itself, without reference to an ulterior end; and in particular, reflection on the 
notion of the most esteemed qualities of character and conduct shows that they 
contain an implicit reference to some other and further good (GSM 107). 
 
Noting the reference to good shows nothing about virtue’s intrinsic desirabil-
ity or whether it is good in itself. But if once one sees the good, one also sees that 
this good determines whether the virtue is valuable, it becomes at least plausible 
to think that the virtue is merely a means to the good (though Sidgwick does 
not explicitly give an argument for the latter claim until later in the chapter).  
 
 
2. In the next section (§ 3.), Sidgwick gives what Tom Hurka reads as his argu-
ment against the position that virtue is one good.26  
 
Shall we then say that Ultimate Good is Good or Desirable conscious or sentient 
Life — of which Virtuous action is one element…? [...] [T]he fact that particu-
lar virtues…are largely valued as means to ulterior good does not necessarily 
prevent us from regarding their exercise as also an element of Ultimate Good: 
just as the fact that physical action, nutrition, and repose…are means to the 
maintenance of our animal life, does not prevent us from regarding them as in-
dispensable elements of such life (396).  
 
On Hurka’s reading, Sidgwick goes on to raise an objection to this suggestion, 
showing a problem for thinking of physical motions in this way and then claim-
ing that the same problem arises for virtue. It “seems difficult to conceive any 
                                                 
26 Hurka, Virtue p. 9. 
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kind of activity or process as both means and end, from precisely the same point 
of view and in respect of precisely the same quality: and in both the cases above 
mentioned it is, I think, easy to distinguish the aspect in which the activities or 
processes in question are to be regarded as means from that in which they are to 
be regarded as in themselves good or desirable” (396). Physical processes are 
means to living, but qua physical processes have no value in themselves. What 
is valuable is “human Life regarded on its psychical side, or, briefly, Conscious-
ness” (396). “In the same way, so far as we judge virtuous activity to be a part 
of Ultimate Good, it is, I conceive, because the consciousness attending it is 
judged to be in itself desirable for the virtuous agent” (397). Call this the 
means/end argument. 
This is a puzzling argument if it is read, with Hurka, as an argument against 
thinking that virtue is one good. 
(i) After giving the means/end argument, Sidgwick is aware that further ar-
gument is needed against the view that virtue is one good: “the Consciousness of 
Virtue” might still be “a part” of “Ultimate Good…conceived as Desirable Con-
sciousness,” and a part not to be identified with pleasure (398); we might take 
“ideal goods” such as virtue, which are not desirable merely qua feeling, to be a 
part of Ultimate Good (400); virtue is not rejected as one good until 400-1 and 
402. So Sidgwick does not seem to take the means/end argument to show that 
virtue is not one good. Perhaps the argument is again directed against the sug-
gestion that character, as a disposition, is intrinsically valuable. The disposition 
could be seen as the means to the consciousness involved in being virtuous, just 
as physical processes are the means to consciousness. But Sidgwick does not 
write of character or disposition here — he writes of “virtuous activity” or the 
“exercise” of virtue — and, in any case, he has already rejected character or dis-
position, on 393-4 (397, 396). 
(ii) The problem for physical motion does not seem to be that it is valuable as 
a means from one point of view and valuable as an end from another point of 
view. Physical motion does not seem valuable as an end at all, unless Sidgwick is 
thinking that consciousness is constituted by (rather than caused, perhaps only 
in part, by) physical motions. Virtue, on the other hand, does seem to many to 
be valuable as a means (to pleasure, for example) and as an end, and there seems 
nothing incoherent about this. It is true that different properties of virtue have 
these values — virtue qua producer of (say) pleasure is valuable as a means; vir-
tue qua, for example, the occurrence of certain desires, is valuable as an end. 
But it is unclear why this is a problem. Perhaps Sidgwick is assuming that vir-
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tue is by definition a producer of some further goods, where this is intended to 
rule out the possibility that virtue is anything else, such as the occurrence of 
certain desires or feelings.27 But (a) he has not established this definition; (b) the 
definition conflicts with his initial descriptions of virtue in III.II, noted above, 
and his treatment of many particular virtues in Book III;28 (c) he does not need 
this definition to give the circle argument, since that argument turns not on a 
definition, but rather on the specific results of the examination of common sense 
morality earlier in Book III, namely that virtues such as benevolence and jus-
tice make reference to further goods to be maximised or distributed fairly (392-
3); and (d) the definition does not rule out the possibility that virtues have other 
qualities (not true of them by definition), and these qualities could be valuable.  
I think this section of III.XIV is better read, not as arguing against virtue as 
one good, but as arguing in favour of “desirable conscious life” as what is good. 
On this reading, Sidgwick first eliminates physical motions. The point of the 
means/end discussion is merely that once the distinction between means and end 
is made, there is no plausibility in thinking physical motions are valuable. In 
the next paragraph (396-7), Sidgwick eliminates conscious life that is not desir-
able. (There is no mention of means and end here.) When Sidgwick then turns to 
virtue, his claim is that “in the same way” we see there is no value to “virtuous 
activity” apart from “the consciousness attending it.” In the earlier argument 
against character as a disposition, Sidgwick is careful to say that what might 
have value is actions or feelings.29 Here he is eliminating actions. I do not read 
“in the same way” as referring back to the means/end argument, but to the 
more general point made against physical motion and undesirable conscious life, 
namely that once we view them on their own, neither is valuable. On my read-
                                                 
27 This is Hurka’s reading (Virtue p. 10). He then argues that the means/end argument fails 
because this definition is inadequate (11). 
28 For the latter, see, for example, pp. 239, 243-5, 249, 250, 253-4, 258-60, 262, 322-4, 326, 
346. 
29 A disposition “can only be defined as a tendency to act or feel in a certain way…and such a 
tendency appears to me clearly not valuable in itself but for the acts and feelings in which it 
takes effect […]. When, therefore, I say that effects on character are important, it is a sum-
mary way of saying that…the present act or feeling is a cause tending to modify importantly 
our acts and feelings in the indefinite future: the comparatively permanent result supposed to 
be produced in the mind or soul, being a tendency that will show itself in an indefinite num-
ber of particular acts and feelings, may easily be more important in relation to the ultimate 
end, than a single act or the transient feeling of a single moment […]”.(393-4). 
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ing, then, Sidgwick is not arguing from a definition of virtue as instrumental to 
producing other goods and the view that what is by definition instrumental to 
producing other goods cannot plausibly be itself intrinsically good. He is instead 
arguing that virtue, insofar as it is valuable as an end, is so because of the feel-
ings or consciousness associated with it.30  
One piece of support for my reading comes from the evolution of III.XIV. 
Sidgwick introduced the argument that physical motions have no value in the 
third edition. There the argument proceeds as I suggest, as an argument by 
elimination for the conclusion that desirable conscious life is what is valuable: 
non-conscious life has no value; undesirable conscious life has no positive value. 
There is no mention of means and ends (3.395). When the means/end discussion 
is added, in the fifth edition, it is inserted into the paragraph arguing that 
physical motions have no value. It would be odd if this insertion were the key 
argument. It seems better read as merely correcting one who might think that 
since physical motions are “indispensable elements” of our life, they are intrinsi-
cally valuable.  
A puzzle about this section remains, however. After concluding that “the con-
sciousness attending” virtuous activity is good, Sidgwick notes that virtue also 
has value as a means. He then writes that “[w]e may make the distinction [pre-
sumably between virtue as means and virtue as end] clearer by considering 
whether Virtuous life would remain on the whole good for the virtuous agent, if 
we suppose it combined with extreme pain.” Sidgwick thinks not. One “would 
hardly venture to assert that the portion of life spent by a martyr in tortures 
was in itself desirable” (397). 
It is tempting to read Sidgwick as arguing that whatever consciousness comes 
with virtue is less valuable than pleasure, since we would trade that conscious-
                                                 
30 J. B. Schneewind seems to have a similar reading of the means/end argument, but he takes 
it to be directed against “the position that conscious virtuous action might be part of the ul-
timate good if we take the ultimate good to be desirable conscious life, and add that desirable 
conscious life has many components, of which virtuous action is one” (Schneewind, Sidgwick’s 
Ethics and Victorian Moral Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon, 1977) p. 315). This describes the 
position Sidgwick does not arrive at until 400, after the means/end argument, and which he 
attacks with arguments on 400-1 and 402, considered below. Arguing merely that it is con-
scious life that is valuable, as opposed to something entirely outside of consciousness, does not 
rule out taking virtue, insofar as it involves consciousness, to be valuable. But since the re-
flection argument on 400-1 is very similar to the means/end argument, Schneewind’s reading 
is understandable.  
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ness to avoid pain. But Sidgwick could not expect agreement on this point; and 
showing it would not show that virtue is not a good (though a lesser one). It is, 
alternatively, tempting to read Sidgwick as arguing that it is the pleasurable 
consciousness attached to virtue that is valuable.31 But since he goes on to treat 
the consciousness attending virtue as a live option for being good, and different 
from pleasure, on 398 and 400, this cannot be right either. 
It is better to read Sidgwick as again concerned with “virtuous activity” in 
particular (397). His point is then that if virtuous activity brought no good con-
sciousness with it (whether that consciousness be pleasure or something else), we 
would not value it. On this reading, when Sidgwick mentions the pain of the 
martyr, pain is standing in for “no good consciousness” (perhaps because ex-
treme pain leaves one conscious of nothing else). This reinforces the point made 
throughout the section, that only consciousness has value, without making idle 
the arguments to come. 
 If this reading is correct, Rashdall makes a good point against Sidgwick, at 
least about the argument up to this point. Rashdall objects that virtue consists 
of desires, volitions, judgments, attentions, and emotions, and that these  
 
are actual elements of consciousness [….] When we pronounce character to 
have value, we are just as emphatically as the Hedonist pronouncing that it is 
in the actual consciousness that value resides, and in nothing else. It is the ac-
tual consciousness of a man who loves and wills the truly or essentially good 
and not mere capacities or potentialities of pleasure-production such as might 
be supposed to reside in a bottle of old port, which constitutes the “goodness” 
or “virtue” which is regarded as a “good” […] by the school which Professor 
Sidgwick is criticizing […] But for the difficulty which Sidgwick seems to make 
of the matter, it would have seemed unnecessary to point out that those who 
make “virtue” an end mean by virtue “virtuous consciousness.”32 
 
Through this point in the chapter, although his arguments may be successful, 
Sidgwick has not engaged with his real opponent.  
 
                                                 
31 For this reading, see Schneewind, p. 316. 
32 Rashdall, Theory i pp. 64, 65; also, directed at the third edition, “Utilitarianism” 224. 
Hayward makes the same point: “Sidgwick’s argument is sound but unnecessary” (Philosophy 
pp. 221; 199, 222, 230-1). 
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3. In the next section (§ 4.), Sidgwick clarifies the position of this opponent. To 
value knowledge is to value something that is within consciousness (a belief) and 
something which goes beyond consciousness (that the belief is true, justified, 
etc.). To value virtue is to value something that is within consciousness (voli-
tions, etc.) and something which goes beyond consciousness (that the volitions, 
etc. are morally good). The arguments above do not conclude that what is valu-
able must be confined to consciousness. They conclude only that consciousness 
must be part of what is valuable. Hence they do not rule out knowledge or vir-
tue as valuable.  
In the following section (§ 5.), Sidgwick argues that virtue, so understood, 
lacks value. The first argument is that he finds it “clear after reflection that 
these objective relations of the conscious subject, when distinguished from the 
consciousness accompanying and resulting from them, are not ultimately and 
intrinsically desirable; any more than material or other objects are, when con-
sidered apart from any relation to conscious existence” (400-1). Call this the re-
flection argument. 
The reflection argument asks why adding something (a material object) that 
has no effect on consciousness adds no value, whereas adding something else 
(the truth or justification of a belief or the goodness of a volition) that has no 
effect on consciousness adds value. Defenders of knowledge or virtue can reply 
that the whole formed by a belief and its truth or justification has more value 
than the belief has on its own, or that the whole formed by a volition and its 
goodness has more value than the volition has on its own.33 The difference be-
tween these additions and adding a material object is just that no whole with 
greater value is brought about by adding a material object.  
Sidgwick might avoid this reply by taking a certain lesson from the discussion 
of material objects. The reason for rejecting material objects is that conscious-
ness is unchanged; that is a reason for rejecting knowledge and virtue as well.34 
The worry is that lacking effects on consciousness may be conclusive against 
material objects, since we cannot see how else they could affect value, but not 
                                                 
33 I put the point in terms of the “holistic” rather than “variability” view, but some might 
want to put it in terms of the latter — rather than thinking a whole with more value is 
formed, one might say that the belief or volition itself acquires more value. For the distinc-
tion, see, for example, Thomas Hurka, “Moore in the Middle,” Ethics 113, 2003, 606-7. 
34 I owe this suggestion to Joyce Jenkins. 
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against other things, such as having correct and justified belief or virtue, that 
could affect value in other ways. 
The second argument is an appeal to “a comprehensive comparison of the or-
dinary judgments of mankind” (400). There are cases “in which the concentra-
tion of effort on the cultivation of virtue has seemed to have effects adverse to 
general happiness, through being intensified to the point of moral fanaticism.” 
In such cases, “we shall…generally admit that…conduciveness to general hap-
piness should be the criterion for deciding how far the cultivation of Virtue 
should be carried” (402).35 Call this the criterion argument.  
One problem with the criterion argument is that it fails to show that virtue is 
not a good. Even if we prefer happiness to virtue, we might think, with Ross, 
that of two worlds equal in happiness but unequal in virtue, the world with 
more virtue is better.36 
Another problem is that some may disagree. Consider not a moral fanatic, but 
rather one with so much sympathy that she sometimes helps others when she is 
not qualified to do so, and so makes matters worse. Some may think a world 
with such people, and less happiness, is better than a world with less sympathy 
and more happiness.37 (Others, again, condemn those who “mean well.”)  
                                                 
35 Similarly, Sidgwick writes that “when Virtue and Happiness are hypothetically presented 
as alternatives, from a universal point of view, I have no doubt that I morally prefer the lat-
ter; I should not think it right to aim at making my fellow-creatures more moral, if I dis-
tinctly foresaw that as a consequence of this they would become less happy. I should even 
make a similar choice as regards my own future virtue, supposing it presented as an alterna-
tive to results more conducive to the General Happiness” (FC 487). Rashdall replies by invit-
ing “the reader to say whether he can accept [this] as a correct representation of his own 
moral consciousness — or of Henry Sidgwick’s” (Theory i, p. 70). 
36 Ross, Right p. 134. 
37 Rashdall gives the following (now unconvincing) example: “On what other grounds can we 
either explain or justify [Common Sense’s] emphatic condemnation of suicide in cases where 
it is clearly conducive to the happiness of the individual and of all connected with him?” 
(“Utilitarianism” 219). Elsewhere he gives examples of bullfighting, Roman wild-beast and 
gladiatorial fights, German students’ face-slashing duels, coursing, pigeon-shooting, and 
drunkenness (“and we should think a man’s conduct in getting drunk worse instead of better 
if he had carefully taken precautions which would prevent the possibility of his doing mis-
chief…while under the influence of his premeditated debauch”) as worse than their absences 
even if they maximise pleasure (Theory i pp. 97-9). (Rashdall also argues, more ambitiously, 
that Sidgwick is inconsistent in taking pleasure but not virtue as good. I examine this argu-
ment in “Utilitarianism,” forthcoming in the Oxford Handbook of the History of Ethics, ed. 
Roger Crisp). 
  
Sidgwick on Virtue 
 
 225
I should note an alternative interpretation. J. B. Schneewind suggests that 
Sidgwick’s point on 402, and earlier when rejecting the good will, is that “there 
is a limit to the extent to which we think it supremely good to act according to 
one’s moral convictions: and the limit is determined by the utilitarian principle. 
Here a dependence argument shows that the good will [or virtue more generally] 
cannot be an ultimate good, for its limits are determined by the claims of an-
other good and its own directives may be overridden in the name of that other 
good.”38  
The problem is that Sidgwick seems to understand by an “ultimate” or “in-
trinsic” good a good which is good as an end rather than just as a means. He 
does not seem to mean a good that is not limited by other goods. For example, 
when he considers whether virtue could be both a “means to ulterior good” and 
“an element of Ultimate Good,” he comments that “it seems difficult to con-
ceive of any kind of activity or process as both means and end…and…it 
is…easy to distinguish the aspect in which the activities…are to be regarded as 
means from that in which they are to be regarded as in themselves good or de-
sirable” (396). Sidgwick takes his opponents to hold that virtue (and other 
things) “are ends independently of the pleasure derived from them” (401). He 
explains that he means by “‘Ultimate Good’ […] that which is Good or Desir-
able per se, and not as a means to some further end” (407n). If so, showing that 
one good is limited by another does not show that the limited good is not ulti-
mate. It might be merely a lesser ultimate good. Thinking that we always trade 
virtue for happiness, even if true, does not show that the value of virtue is de-
pendent on its production of happiness. Schneewind’s interpretation has the ad-
vantage of making the criterion argument valid. But it has the disadvantage of 
not fitting Sidgwick’s claims about means and ends and, more importantly, 
makes Sidgwick talk past those, like Ross, who hold the usual understanding of 
“intrinsic” or “ultimate.”  
Sidgwick might have tried a different strategy. In the case of knowledge, the 
appeal to the ordinary judgments of mankind proceeds by noting that knowl-
edge is valued in proportion to the happiness it brings. The connection to hap-
piness can explain why we value even apparently fruitless knowledge, both be-
cause we know that such knowledge can “become unexpectedly fruitful” and 
                                                 
38 Schneewind, p. 314. This interpretation also fits the passage concerning Liberality, etc., 
quoted earlier.  
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because its pursuit is itself pleasurable and shows a disposition likely to produce 
fruitful knowledge (401). Call this the proportion argument.  
It does not follow that knowledge is good only as a means. First, each piece of 
knowledge might have the same value, with the proportion claim made true by 
combining these values with the differing amounts of happiness produced.39 
Second, pieces of knowledge might vary in value, but not so much that less 
valuable knowledge that produces greater happiness is ranked lower than more 
valuable knowledge that produces less happiness. Since the proportionality 
claim is hardly precise, it might be hard to discount this possibility. Third, 
Ross’s example of two worlds equal in happiness and unequal in knowledge 
convinces some that the proportionality claim is false.40  
Sidgwick might have tried a parallel argument for virtue. He does not explic-
itly say that virtues are valued in proportion to the happiness they bring. But 
he makes the similar claim that utilitarianism explains our ranking of duties 
(425-6); it is plausible to think that the “minor” virtues — Sidgwick lists cau-
tion, decision, good humour, meekness, mildness, gentleness, placability, mercy, 
liberality, politeness, and courtesy (236, 253, 321, 324-5) — are minor because 
they are usually less productive of happiness than virtues such as benevolence 
and justice; he argues that virtues such as purity, courage and humility, which 
seem to be admired independently of happiness, really do, insofar as they are 
admired, contribute to happiness (or other virtues) (332, 334, 355, 356n, 429, 
450-3, 456); and when Sidgwick later writes that in III.XIV he “tried to show 
that Common Sense is unconsciously utilitarian in its practical determination of 
those very elements in the notion of Ultimate Good or Wellbeing which at first 
sight least admit of a hedonistic interpretation,” he suggests that the utilitarian 
ranking of pieces of knowledge is to be paralleled by a utilitarian ranking of vir-
tues (453-4). 
Just as with the proportionality argument against knowledge, this is hardly 
conclusive. But two of the reasons for resisting the proportionality argument in 
the knowledge case seem less telling in the case of virtue. Few proponents of vir-
tue would claim that each instance of virtue has the same value. And perhaps, 
given the importance ascribed to virtue, it would be difficult to hold that differ-
ences in the values of virtues are sufficiently small as to exclude the possibility 
                                                 
39 Skelton noted that Ross himself rejects this; see Right p. 139. 
40 Ross, Right p. 139. 
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that a more important virtue that produces less happiness has more value than 
a less important virtue that produces more happiness.  
Ross’s appeal to worlds of equal happiness and unequal virtue remains. But 
here Sidgwick might note that Ross’s verdict is controversial — in my experi-
ence, at best half agree with Ross — and, as with knowledge, Ross’s intuition 
might be explained away, given how difficult it is to imagine something nor-
mally so useful as making no difference. Slight variations in the presentation of 
the case also seem to hurt Ross. For example, say I could increase virtue by 
writing an inspirational book in moral philosophy, but this would make no dif-
ference to the amount or distribution of happiness in the world. (Say the book 
increases the number of actions done out of duty, but that in all these cases self-
interest would have led to the same action.) Many think it does not matter 
whether I write the book or not. 
This, at any rate, seems the sort of argument Sidgwick should have stressed. 
If he had, the supporters of virtue who came later would at least have had to 
work harder. It is regrettable that so much of III.XIV is spent on other matters.  
 
 
Appendix 
 
III.XIV in the final edition incorporates, not always smoothly, changes made 
over the first four editions. It may be helpful to briefly chart these changes. 
In the first edition, Sidgwick notes that “the majority of moral persons would 
probably declare that Virtue is the chief good [but] very few would maintain 
that the only thing in life intrinsically desirable is the habit of obeying moral 
rules” (1.369). Against the view that virtue is the only good, he gives a quick 
version of the circle argument (1.369, 376). There is also a version of the argu-
ment against dispositions as being of value, but Sidgwick does not take this to 
count against virtue, but rather to specify that virtue is a matter of “conscious 
action and feelings” (1.369). Virtue is rejected as a good, along with other objec-
tive relations such as knowledge, on the basis of the reflection argument (1.371-
2). The criterion argument against virtue and the proportion argument against 
knowledge do not appear. 
In the second edition, the circle argument is expanded to roughly its final 
form (2.364-5). Virtue is dismissed on the basis of it: it follows from the circle 
argument that “we cannot, without manifest divergence from Common Sense, 
introduce [virtue] in a scientific explanation of the nature of Ultimate Good” 
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(2.365). This is a blunder not made in the first edition, and not wholly corrected 
until the fifth: the circle argument excludes virtue only as the sole good, not as 
one good. The prominence of the circle argument, and the focus on virtue as the 
sole good, may be due to Bradley’s Ethical Studies and Professor Sidgwick’s He-
donism, both of which appeared between the first and second editions. Bradley 
sometimes claims that the sole good is “function,” and sometimes treats “func-
tion” and “virtue” as interchangeable.41  
In the second edition, knowledge is presented as an alternative to virtue or 
happiness and is rejected by the reflection argument and the proportion argu-
ment (2.366-9).42  
In the third edition, Sidgwick expands the argument against dispositions to 
roughly its final state (3.393). One difference is that he takes it to be a further 
argument ruling out virtue, and not just dispositions, as one good (3.394). 
Unlike the circle argument, this argument could show that virtue is not one 
good, provided one thought of virtue just as a disposition — but as Rashdall 
notes, defenders of virtue need not think this. This may explain why, by the 
fourth edition, the argument is taken to discredit only dispositions, and not vir-
tue in general.43  
The third edition also adds the arguments against physical processes and 
mere survival. They are introduced to limit what is valuable to conscious life 
(3.395).  
The fourth edition adds the argument against the will to do what one takes to 
be right (4.394). Sidgwick recognises that, even if this argument succeeds, the 
good will could still be one good: it would be a paradox to “affirm [subjective 
rightness of will] to be the sole Ultimate Good” but not “paradoxical to regard 
the settled will to realise our duty as an essential part of ultimate good: while at 
the same time recognising that there are effects of right volition […] which are 
also in themselves good” (4.394).44 He then objects that if I “suppose that the 
                                                 
41 See, for example, F H. Bradley, Professor Sidgwick’s Hedonism, in Bradley, Collected Essays 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1925) pp. 95, 96n, 97, 98, Ethical Studies (Oxford: Claren-
don, 1927) pp. 136, 137, 138; Hedonism pp. 97, 98, Studies pp. 140-1. 
42 The second edition is very similar to “Hedonism and Ultimate Good,” Mind o.s. 2, 1877, 
published in the same year. 
43 The upshot in the third edition is that “virtues or talents, faculties, habits or dispositions of 
any kind” are not goods (3.393). In the fourth and later editions, the upshot is that “faculties, 
habits, or dispositions of any kind” are not goods (4.393, 393).  
44 This is noted by Schneewind, pp. 313-14.  
  
Sidgwick on Virtue 
 
 229
effects of a man’s acting in accordance with his conception of what is right will 
be on the whole bad — according to an estimate of badness framed without tak-
ing into account the subjective rightness of the volition — , I find that this con-
sideration of them appears to me finally decisive of their badness. In my view, 
therefore, this Subjective rightness of volition is not Good in itself, but only as a 
means” (4.395). There is no further discussion of virtue as one good. In effect, 
Sidgwick runs the criterion argument not against virtue in general, but against 
one account of virtue, as the good will.  
The fifth edition (which for III.XIV is the same as the later editions) takes se-
riously the concession made regarding the good will: not only the good will, but 
also virtue more generally, has not been excluded as one good by the circle ar-
gument. Sidgwick then restores virtue to the place it had in the first edition, as 
an objective relation like knowledge. (Virtue has this place in the Lectures as 
well (GSM 126).) It is rejected by the reflection argument, as in the first edition, 
and by the new criterion argument, which generalises the point made against 
the good will in the fourth edition.45  
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
 
                                                 
45 Thanks to Darcie Fehler, Adam Muller, Emily Muller, Jeff Verman, Sandy Vettese and 
Andrew Webb for discussion of some of the examples; to Tom Hurka for discussion of many 
of the moves in the paper; and to Joyce Jenkins and Anthony Skelton for detailed comments 
on an earlier draft.  
